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Introduction: 
A discussion on censorship at any political or legal moment is hardly complete with a mere 
narration of contemporary events, without invoking a philosophical and historical lineage of 
bodies of control and discipline. By this, one does not only indicate institutions that form the 
censor-board(s)only, but also those institutions, creators of a problematic discourse, causative-
agents of aesthetic rebellions that involve a response to these censorships. They would be the 
problem-makers to laws legitimizing control, but their motives can be read as practices that very 
gradually politicize aesthetics, which then becomes a response both inevitably progressive and 
shocking. It involves stretching the permitted projections of the self (“self-fashioning”, a subject 
that would be taken up soon) in terms of aesthetic bodies capable of continuing the discussion on 
the very subject of control, thereby questioning it, or manipulating it to various degrees. The 
series of responses and questions raised thereby indicate the ever-immanent association of 
censorship and ethics. Without asserting an opinion over the legitimacy and fairness of 
censorship, my objective is to exemplify the ways in which ethics functions in correspondence 
with history and conventions to chalk out responses and counter-responses which may lead to 
unacceptance or censorship by bodies of control. Moreover, it is notable that the self functions as 
the centre of individualistic expression, declaration and avowal of beauty, sexuality and political 
or ethical agency. This article would like to analyze Foucault’s theories of “care of the self” to 
relate the modern current of individualism to the Graeco-Roman influence of Epicureanism on 
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the Aesthetic school of the 1990s. It would, in the second part, focus on the changing 
philosophies of this school of the late Victorian society by a detailed examination of Walter 
Pater’s Marius the Epicurean, and Oscar Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray, comparing the 
ethical stance of each; and analyze how their art was closely related to the problems posed by 
prohibition and its extent. 
The Dandy 
I would like to begin by briefly examining the implication of Foucault’s use of the term 
“flaneur” to describe what he considers the embodiment of modern living in the essay What is 
Enlightenment? Not only does it serve as a metaphor of existence, but it also anticipates 
articulations on the socio-economic, historical and cultural experiences that characterized the 
flaneur as a category of response, an expression of subjectivity imbibed and concentrated in 
awareness of the physical body, specifically in terms of the emergence of modernity in France. 
Elsewhere, as in England self-fashioning took a similar but not identical direction, being a 
product of the Aesthetic movement among other influences unique to England. In any case, 
Foucault only fleetingly remarks upon the English Aesthetic movement once in the interview 
published as On the Genealogy of Ethics (Foucault 271).But he does, of course discuss 
Baudelaire to bring up the idea of modernity as an elaboration of individual awareness. Also, the 
Aesthetes have repeatedly admired Baudelaire and have readily associated themselves with the 
Baudelairean dandy. Oscar Wilde, we may remember at this point, reveals his very deep 
admiration for Baudelaire’s Les Fleurs Du Mal (1857)in these lines in The Critic as Artist: 
And if we grow tired of an antique time, and desire to realize our own age in all 
its weariness and sin, are there not books that can make us live more in one single 
hour than life can make us live in a score of shameful years? Close to your hand 
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lies a little volume, bound in some Nile-green skin that has been powdered with 
gilded nenuphars and smoothed with hard ivory…it is Baudelaire's masterpiece. 
(Wilde Intensions 165) 
 Therefore, it is no surprise that the views of the Aesthetes and the Decadents converged on 
many points. In so far as both were interested in manifestations of beauty in art, literature and 
life; and that they emphasized the subjectivity of opinion and triumph of the individual over the 
mass or crowd, they could be called remarkably similar. Both these practices of the self are 
performed on the self. There is an element of artifice in them, not only related to the necessity of 
beautification of the body, but also to the implication of the body on subjectivity. But in the 
Foucauldian sense, such “self-awareness” is intricately bound up to the “limits” imposed on the 
enjoyment of pleasure, in other words to the degree and direction of censorship of expressions of 
the self. These limits are not merely external impositions that are unidirectional and prohibitory, 
as they also reclaim the existence of these prohibited or censored acts or performances in the 
possibility of any discourse about them or surrounding them. Therefore, self-awareness must also 
be acknowledged as a response to the possibility of loss of control. Loss of self by unsustainable 
hedonism, or through “voiceless-ness”, or by agreement to “normalcy” or by being coerced 
through censorship, is ultimately nothing but loss of power, whether civil or ethical; and this 
entails danger or fear of death, bodily, moral or social.  
“Care of the Self” and Pleasure as a Goal 
Foucault locates some historical moments in which the relationship between the subject and 
power changes. In case of the earlier Greeks, till Platonic thought currents prevailed, he says that 
care of the self is related to care of others because the good life of the others are related to the 
self and therefore, good care of oneself would simply imply better social relations- 
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epimeleisthaisautou, as he mentions in Technologies of the Self, "to take care of yourself", "to be 
concerned, to take care of yourself."(Foucault226)It involves the management of the self in a 
space of interconnected power relations, largely civic. These are “both truth and prescriptions.” 
In case of the later Stoics the idea of power in relation to the self changes because there exists a 
set of rules or basic principles which are the logos of conduct. Freedom is non-slavery, or control 
over the self more than bad practices can control the self. The same thought is carried further 
when Christianity introduces the concept of an afterlife so that the care of the self, already 
related to good conduct, gets woven into freedom from sin. Later, the definition of power gets 
institutionalized in terms of knowledge in modern Europe. In each of these shifts however, one 
may observe there exists a relation of “care of the self” with a fear of “loss of control”; it is an 
anxiety that marks man’s tendency to question his position in the world. Therefore, as far as any 
form of policing or censorship, usually expressed in terms of ethical justifications, is concerned, 
it entails fear from both sides of the activity in question: first, the fear of the rebel entails the 
problem, how far can I reach without foregoing the “care of the self” for pleasure; and second, 
the fear of the disciplining body which is accountable for censorship entails the question, how far 
can the rebel’s reach be permitted so as to prevent a mass fascination with pure pleasure, thus 
ignoring the relation of the self to civic society. 
The modern man’s posture, is distinct because it is the “spectator’s posture”. 
(Foucault311) But Foucault goes on to clarify why this posture of an interplay of the present with 
memory involves a subtle violence with respect to time and mortality. There is an awareness of 
self-differentiation from the crowd that characterizes each of these modern practices of the self. 
One may fleetingly refer to the possibility of treating ethics in terms of real or lived encounters, 
as does Levinas, in the experience of encountering the infinitely Other face-to-face.
1
 But this 
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tradition of ethics as a discursive practice essentially concerns itself with and is evoked by 
conversation; it is distinct from the self-reflexive or contemplative free ethics of the Stoics. 
Ethics as a cultivation (as I intend to deal with in the limited scope of this article), is as much an 
aesthetic methodology as a legislation, as opposed to ethics as a “first philosophy” that is 
interpretive and intersubjective. The position of spectatorship is the modern man’s moment of 
contemplative ethical classicism. At the same time, as the essay would attempt to duly establish, 
the aspiration of an aesthetic embrace of beauty is individualistic but not counterculture. In fact, 
the very laws that govern the aesthetic ideal posing as “free”, “eternal” or “formal” are governed 
by inter-subjective relations. 
At this point, let us turn to the special place of the Aesthetes of 19
th
 century. The 
problematic ethical position of the late Victorian dandy is the problem of divergent ethics. He is 
situated in Victorian bourgeois society characterized by a complex interplay of consumerism, 
conservatism and latent sexual desire. It is deeply entrenched in association of the self with sin. 
But he is well versed with the Classical philosophies, literature and their taste in the arts. He 
belongs to that upper class which has suddenly lost its hold on economy and governance due to 
the sudden rise of the middle classes and all that he now has as a mark of his class are his 
aesthetic standards or his refinement. He detests the masses enough to wish to shock their 
notions of morality but at the same time he realizes that they are the consumers of the spectacle 
of his aristocratic life. There are twin ethical standards, one that is Christian, juridical and which 
belongs to the masses; and another that is pagan, purely a cultivation of individual interest and 
elitist self-education. In such a context, the Aesthetes were treated dismissively as hedonists 
whose actions in public and private life failed to keep up to their proclaimed Classical influences. 
Their common outcry of “art for art’s sake” quickly degenerated them into vague and self-
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centred social anomalies rather than the promised body of art they would have liked to be. These 
problems bring forth certain questions: Was there a gap between the cautious and rather critical 
stance of the early Aesthetes like Ruskin and Pater towards pagan philosophies like Stoicism and 
Epicureanism, and the later Aesthetes, like Wilde in actual embrace of some of these ideals in 
their own lives and works? Did they evade the ethical dimensions of Stoicism or Epicureanism in 
terms of its social responsibilities while seeking pure art, or “becoming a piece of art”, or did 
their way of life degenerate into unhindered hedonism? If so, this would be very unlike the 
Greek philosophies that inspired them at least initially (which were well known and widely read 
by that time and which, if evaded, would have been intentional). 
Marius the Epicurean and Pater’s Sense of Ethics 
We may first refer to a few instances from Walter Pater’s Marius the Epicurean: His Sensations 
and Ideas (first published in 1885) to observe that the attitudes of wonder and appreciation 
expressed in the text to Epicureanism and Stoicism are mixed with a sense of restraint. Oscar 
Wilde, the iconic figure of the cult of the dandy was a student of Pater; so it might be useful to 
look into Pater’s most influential work before trying to read Wilde’s aestheticism in detail. 
Pater’s narrator is inclined to stick to a Christian sense of ethics in a text set in the late Roman 
Empire, especially in defining virtues of the soul and in addressing philanthropy as the spiritual 
duty of the subject. This can be observed in the progress of the ethical principles of the 
protagonist, a young boy, living in the countryside in the last decades of the Roman Empire, the 
years coinciding with the rise of Christianity. Marius comes under the influence of the dominant 
philosophical schools of the age and his temperament grows to be that of a lover of beauty, who 
is however faced with the dilemma which the omniscient narrator calls a dilemma of “an early 
Christian” (Pater I: Chapter II), who however, being born a pagan, could not find a religion or a 
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spiritual model to perfectly fit his conscience. Pater’s portrayal of Graeco-Roman philosophy is 
clearly not one of abandon and amorality but he is explicit in mentioning the sombre atmosphere 
that Marius grew up in, an atmosphere of deliberate upkeep and maintenance that is borne out in 
a deep concern with the body as a container of the soul. The growth of medical practice 
described in detail in the early part of the first book indicates how these ideas of “care of the 
self” became deeply rooted in the way of living of the general populace, so that the art and 
“family” of Aesculapius became an “institution”: 
…(T)he apparatus of the medical art, the salutary mineral or herb, diet or 
abstinence, and all the varieties of the bath, came to have a kind of sacramental 
character, so deep was the feeling… the body becoming truly, in that case, but a 
quiet handmaid of the soul. 
Further it says of Marius: 
He was of the number of those who… must be made perfect by the love of visible 
beauty.”(Pater I: Chapter III) 
The narrator mentions Plato’s Phaedrus as the source of this type of discourse, “which supposes 
men’s spirits susceptible to certain influences, diffused…by fair things and persons visibly 
present…and confirming the seer to themselves as with some cunning physical necessity” (Pater 
I: Chapter III). The phrase “physical necessity” for natural things of beauty ascertains that 
external beauty of things is related to the concept of need, and beauty is not treated as anything 
less than a requisite condition of good life. It is notable that many of the letters and speeches of 
the Stoics bear reference to the same text, pointing out that it indeed was influential in shaping 
contemporary way of life. Marius is delighted by his childhood friend and influence, Flavianus, 
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who instills the love of beauty in him. The short chapter in which the two friends read the story 
of Cupid and Psyche (Chapter V) together is filled with sensual imagery describing the beauty of 
the surroundings of the young boys as well as the sumptuous formal perfection of the Greek 
myth. After Flavian’s death due to prolonged illness, Marius is directly influenced by 
Epicureanism as a theory. It is interesting that the narrator treats Marius’ own instinctual 
Epicureanism, partly developed by the early influence of the practices of Flavianus, as in 
constant contest with the theory of New Cyrenaicism (a version of Epicureanism), which is 
subject to attack and rejection by Marcus Aurelius. There is a split between the philosophical 
theory that Marius admires intellectually and the “lifestyle” (self-fashioning?) that he continued 
as a practice. The relation between pleasure and ethics is kept unresolved. 
The two otherwise contending schools of Epicureanism and Stoicism were however 
similar in the rejection of fear of the gods which they condemned as superstitions to delude the 
thoughtless and ignorant. They also emphasized individual responsibility for action which would 
no longer be governed by authority of civic laws or by a general concern for civic wellness, but 
by a sense of what is best for the self in the present and future. The narrator goes on to elaborate 
the associations of this “new Cyrenaicism” (Epicureanism, as experienced by Marius as a boy) 
and its difference to hedonism and how the philosophy is susceptible to misinterpretation in its 
call for pleasure. It is almost evident that the narrator expresses a genuine appreciation of the 
Epicurean’s taste for the “eager, concentrated, impassioned realization of experience” (Pater I: 
Chapter IX), but at the same time he is also aware of the problems of the same, in its tendency to 
posit itself antagonistically to ritual or what the Christian narrator calls “morality.” It is clear to 
the narrator that the claims of unethical hedonism against the Epicureans are incorrect. 
Subsequently, Marius is influenced by the Stoicism of Marcus Aurelius who convinces him of 
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the need to reject the elitism of an Epicurean way of life, which admits a natural inclination of 
man towards life free from suffering. Marcus Aurelius instead proclaims the need to live a 
humble life of minimum necessities and to reduce passions to a minimum. But Marius is soon 
disillusioned by this school of philosophy when he becomes aware of the indifference of the 
stoic to pain and suffering of others. His dilemma and discontent arises out of an innately 
Epicurean nature that however, cannot come to terms with certain tenets of the philosophy. The 
late Roman philosophers, especially the Stoics, as mentioned earlier, attribute a certain code of 
conduct to ensure a wise control over one’s own will, or a self-fashioning that makes a 
separation necessary between natural or instinctual inclinations and tendencies, and an ethical 
life of “fittingness.” The Epicurean way of life also projects a concern with the self in a similar 
way. But this rejects an ethical involvement with the other subject, who is purely unrelated to 
individual health or pleasure through civic life. Philosophers like Cicero argue on behalf of 
Epicureanism that wisdom guarantees the knowledge of good and bad through the realization of 
cause and effect of actions. Only an ethical action, in so far as it ascertains no possibility of 
incurring pain later is good action, or action that is justified by its fittingness or decorum in Latin 
and “prepon” in Greek. (Bychkov and Sheppard 125) This means, ethics is related to a clear 
wisdom of the truth. This implies prudent action. In the words of Cicero, an action is ethically 
acceptable: 
…(F)or it is fitting to use reason and speech prudently and do what you do 
considerately, as well as discern and preserve the truth in all matters. On the 
contrary it is as unfitting and indecorous to be mistaken, err, fail and be deceived as 
to be mad or delirious. In the same vein, all just things are fitting, and the unjust, on 
the contrary, are ugly and therefore unfitting. (Bychkov and Sheppard 136)  
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Cicero also quotes from a lecture delivered by Lucius Torquatus, in the 1
st
 book of De Finibus. 
Torquatus was asked what makes men risk their all for battles and the like if their sole purpose in 
life, as naturally inclined men, were solely pleasure, “complete removal of pain.” To this 
question, Lucius replies, it was honor and esteem, the strongest guarantees of security in life. 
(Cicero 17-75)The governing motive of life is pleasure, which itself is dependent on security. The 
idea is very different from the kind of civic concern of the Platonists because it contains the idea of 
honor and esteem which are very close to the sense of self. This in turn implies the subject is 
responsible to his surroundings to care for himself, and in the process, to care for his surroundings. 
Also, it implies a mutual responsiveness of each to the other, which makes the basic substrate of any 
argument claiming political necessity of censorship of motive, delimitation of pleasure or control of 
the body. 
Also, the point becomes clear from the above quoted lines that the association of fine-
ness or beauty with decorum or fittingness makes it quite contrary to the accusations of 
hedonism. Relentless and un-thinking quest for pleasure, driven by luxury alone is not the motto 
of Aesthetic movement, which was, as mentioned above, influenced by these very schools of 
philosophy. However, when we look at the caution with which the subject of Epicureanism is 
treated in Marius, it is not so much a hesitancy towards hedonism, as it is a propensity to fall 
back on the Christian virtuosity. Marius is disturbed by Marcus Aurelius’ unresponsiveness to 
others’ pain as long as he does not contribute as its cause in any way. (Pater I: Chapter XIV) 
The goal of the Stoic or the Epicurean, of evading pain, leads up to a tenet of indifference 
at some level, in confining the responsibility of one’s action within the premises of his life as a 
mortal, which is a rather insufficient solution in the Christian worldview. This is because the 
Christian self is created not only in terms of actions but also thoughts of the mind. The fear of 
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death that governs the aesthetic self in Hellenic philosophy meets a different set of demands in 
case of a Christian soul with a concept of the afterlife. Foucault calls this a paradoxical change 
that comes up with Christianity because, for the Christian, death is not the end, but a means to 
salvation, so there is no need to rush through life; and renunciation becomes a means to 
salvation. Even if renouncing pleasures is an important tenet of Stoicism, the end of “ethical 
practice” is governed by death, so the question of prudence arises only as it can distance pain 
from the subject as far as the final moment of death. At the same time, these analogies with 
Pater’s text make it clear that he did not employ misrepresentations of Graeco-Roman ethical 
notions in art; and was definitely not equating Epicureanism with hedonism. But there appears to 
be a dualism already evident in the first of the Aesthetes about the ethics of the Aesthete hero. It 
is clear that much of the narrator’s sympathies with the pagan hero are associated with his being 
a Christian soul in a pagan body. He is a lover of beauty and pleasure at the core, but he cannot 
ascertain spiritual fulfillment through the same. Marius represents the problem of the “Graeco-
Roman Victorian.” 
Pater’s highly influential book, Studies in the History of the Renaissance was also that 
which, according to Michael Patrick Gillespie, led to Pater’s “acquiescence to the suppression of 
the original conclusion” (Gillespie 6). However, it was not unusual to try to maintain an 
equilibrium between public opinion or censorship and the author’s own views. Pater asserts that 
art is most detrimentally judged by current ethical standards. But at the same time he remains a 
proto-modernist as he does not resolve the problem of the disjunction between art and ethics, 
which becomes problematic only a generation later when life aspires to become art. There is the 
typically Aesthetic rejection of Victorian moral values, but he remains unsure as to what the 
alternative standards should be.  Pater’s student Oscar Wilde is perhaps the closest we can get to 
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the dandy, the man who has most approximated a piece of art. Perhaps this is the reason why his 
views are associated to such an extent to his works that they inevitably lead to conclusions that 
confuse. Apart from his unparalleled craft of beautification, his penchant for epigrams and his 
upper class heroes, Wilde was also the most successful aristocratic symbol of refined and high 
lifestyle. Richard Hibbit writes, for instance, “he was fêted by the mass media; he was adept at 
public relations.” (65) In other words, he could become a lifestyle icon at a time when the flags 
of Victorian morality were flying high but ironically, he could become so in a vein quite contrary 
to conventions. 
 
Art for Art’s Sake 
The dandies of the 90s cultivated themselves such as to make perfection of their own form an 
expression of their exquisite individualism, in creating new yardsticks of taste, and taste itself a 
yardstick of human worth. These indices lay beyond all previous laws that defined subject 
relations to society. It was as the icon of such a cult that Wilde owed his fame as well as infamy. 
From advertisements of ice-creams to pamphlets on interior decoration, Oscar Wilde’s fixed 
expression of impermeability and natural indifference could manage to draw people to gaze at 
the phenomenon of formal perfection. Wilde was incessant in his advocating of a life free from 
any moral hypocrisy and suppression of individuality. He was often called the “elite Bohemian” 
in referring to his amoral personal choices as well as the eloquent philosophy of pleasurable life 
he kept reiterating through his works. Finally, his last works show him embittered with the 
double standards that rendered him so helpless and pushed him to penury. Wilde’s detachment 
was characteristically Epicurean but his disregard for the ethical in art becomes evident and more 
problematic than Pater’s claims when he regards in numerous accounts, both in textual 
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expressions as well as in social discourses, the “harmony with one’s self” (Wilde The Picture of 
Dorian Gray 76) above harmony with society as a whole. It would be wrong to say Wilde is 
unconcerned with goodness, as the aesthetic alternatives that he proposes are in themselves 
creating a new ethical standard- one that would be better armed than the Victorians to observe 
and realize transcendental values of art.  
At the same time, it is extremely reductive to define Wilde’s works in terms of a structure 
of ethical intention. It is important to realize that Wilde’s construction of the self is different 
from the Romans precisely because he is a modern man who is fascinated by the Roman way of 
life. Here we must recall Foucault’s lines that provide valuable perception of the dandy’s way of 
life. Foucault is clear in pointing out that the stance of the dandy is one of a staged appearance. 
His “doctrine of elegance” (Foucault 312) is performative and he derives pleasure in shocking 
his audience. 
In The Reception of Oscar Wilde in Europe, edited by Stefano Angelista, the impeccable 
methods by which aestheticism becomes a public movement is appreciated in terms of its 
delicate balance between shock and sympathy. Wilde’s own reaction to the circulating 
caricatures and lampoons based on his image as the iconic Aesthete provides us with some 
evidence that he treated his elaborate performance as a New Hedonist, as a spectacular art for the 
eyes of his public. Ostermark-Johansen enlists names like “Oscuro Wildgoose”,“the Wilde Eyed 
Poet”, “Our own Aesthetic Bard” and “Ossian Wilderness”, other than those which “frequently 
ridiculed his effeminacy (“Frøken Hermine Bang” or “Miss Hermine Bang”), his homosexuality 
(“Hr. Manbang”) and his cosmopolitan sympathies (“Ermano de Bang”, “Hermann von 
Bangemachen” and “Armand de Bangenét”).” (Ostermark-Johansen 230) It shocks the audience 
to see his extremism- which may be an overwhelming passion for beauty or an inhuman 
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detachment to suffering or poverty. He felt, if there was anything worse than being talked about, 
it was not being talked about! (Doody 51)Such extremism is part of his performance, which 
interestingly implies that the dandy may not be held accountable for opinions in the course of 
performances. 
Turning into Art 
The debates regarding the viability and the degree of censorship of this man’s life and art could 
be turned around by him into an inquisition into the same line of thought. By provoking response 
to censorship of such exemplary “turning into art”, Wilde also initiates a continual discourse that 
fed on its own expressions of apprehensions or doubts about concerns of individualism or 
subjectivity. It initiates, via condemnation, a tentative encounter with the modern. The reviews to 
his The Picture of Dorian Gray were harsh to say the least, so much so that much of it was 
banned for a long time and what we have usually read is only a censored version of the original 
that was abhorred for being explicit about the so-called devious kinds of love. I would not go 
into the details of concessions that had to be made in order to make the novel suitable for 
contemporary sense of propriety, and more fundamentally, to permit its publication, because that 
alone has formed the subject of much detailed research already. But at the same time all his 
general opinions, whether in his novel or otherwise, were lapped up by the public either for 
curiosity or for pure enjoyment of his art. Du Maurier’s caricatures of the dandy in the Punch, 
which were evidently based on him, were no less popular and Wilde’s critics’ rebuttal of his 
claims along with his own responses to each of these attacks only kept increasing his charm over 
the decade, till his sudden persecution for sodomy that led to his imprisonment. Yet what is 
noteworthy in Wilde’s unique method of circumventing the demands and expectations of his 
audience is that he seemed to be enjoying the masquerade he was putting on as an elaborate but 
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lovely lie, instead of a harsh truth against art that is not threatening to the moral police. His plays 
were all satires against the hypocrisy of Victorian morality but they were never too provocative. 
Gillespie seems to suggest that he makes it very difficult to locate the locus of bypassing 
limitations at any fixed point (14). An assimilation of diverse possibilities of imaginative range 
demands a scope of the risks they may pose. Therefore, the creation of perfect art demands 
incorporation of those exercises of enhancement, that may or may not result in obliteration of 
elements unnecessary for formal perfection. Wilde’s aim was to make ethics extremely 
subjective. The obvious question that arises is how far can ethical subjectivity be taken, when 
one is the subject of one’s own art? To put the question in Foucault’s own terms:  
What should one do with oneself? What work should be carried out on the self? 
How should one "govern oneself" by performing actions in which one is oneself the 
objective of those actions, the domain in which they are brought to bear, the 
instrument they employ, and the subject that acts? (Foucault 87) 
Gillespie mentions that in a letter to Ralph Payne dated 12 February 1894, Wilde talks about 
“multiple aesthetic meta-systems” of The Picture of Dorian Gray, partly in a style, typical of 
him, of amusing and perplexing his readers at the same time; and partly to ridicule the critics 
who simplistically attacked the amorality of his only novel. He quotes Wilde:  
I am so glad you like that strange colored book of mine: it contains much of me in 
it. Basil Hallward is what I think I am: Lord Henry what the world thinks me: 
Dorian what I would like to be in other ages perhaps. (qtd. in Gillespie 58) 
If we consider the novel in terms of its dialectics, we would notice almost always that there are 
choices available to Dorian Gray and each time he is conscious of the same. Even when he 
confesses he has come so far as to not have a choice to go back, it is evident to the reader that he 
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is willfully testing the margins of his actions, stretching the limitations to the extremes of 
experience, to the point where it will be accepted no more either by any justifiable ethical 
system, or any political potentate. This becomes particularly relevant to us in our concern with 
censorship or the radical delimitation of choices. Perhaps this is the point where censorship 
becomes the most problematic in spite of its justifications with respect to selfhood and social 
cause. Censorship as an extreme form of control contradicts its own position when it rejects the 
thrill of experience to its subject while ironically citing care, or nurture. This is particularly 
problematic when care of the self, as we have seen, is also an exploration of the tendencies of the 
self, and a test of how far can pleasure be made viable to the self. The reader is invited to marvel 
at the thrill of indulgences. Censorship prohibits such a possibility out of an apprehensive fear of 
failure of judgment. 
However, the novel’s structure does not forgo repeated references to the expectations of 
Victorian ethics. The fascination with the self, at once aware of its displacement from the natural 
as well as proud of its aesthetic accomplishment on itself is evident in these lines: 
[H]e would sit in front of the picture, sometimes loathing it and himself, but filled, 
at other times, with that pride of individualism that is half the fascination of sin, 
and smiling, with secret pleasure, at the misshapen shadow that had to bear the 
burden that should have been his own. (Wilde 135) 
The narrative shifts and wavers alternately between the objective and the subjective moral codes. 
Each time Victorian expectations are suggested, there are corresponding openings to separate 
subjective recipient positions. It is as if each character becomes an element in an elaborate 
experiment, which is complicated by the possibility that Wilde treats these characters as different 
performances of his own self, just like in a theatre a single actor may play more than one 
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character. If we take the instance of the Sibyl episode, then it is seen to provoke different 
reactions from each of the characters, Lord Henry, Basil and Dorian Gray. Here too, Dorian 
himself consciously makes a choice in favor of art over life, but the choice is inherent with 
complexities when we note that throughout the novel the boundaries of life and art are not fixed. 
Lord Henry appears to be the agent of Dorian’s paideia or special schooling, just like Marius’ 
schooling as seen in Pater’s work. But even Lord Henry appears to perform a role of particular 
interest to him. He professes more in the Ciceronian tradition rather than treating philosophy as a 
practice of good life in himself. He dons the role of an ideal teacher of hedonism to observe the 
flowering of Dorian as a product of this philosophy that interested him intellectually. 
Interestingly, Lord Henry’s transgression is limited, in so far as Lord Henry does not face the 
same end that Dorian does. Murder is unethical by any school of philosophy; and contrary to 
many responses to the text, the reason why Dorian commits murder is not that he is unaware of 
the difference between transgressing ethics and transgressing Victorian morality but a more 
likely determinant may be his will to commit horrific acts as an extreme presentation of his art 
on the self. He is his performance and cannot abandon it. He is so rapt in his practice that he 
exudes indifference and authority even when he addresses Campbell, the man he blackmails into 
destroying the body of Basil whom he murdered. (Wilde 162-166) 
The problem with Dorian, and that which kills him eventually of fear of experience of 
aging, is that while he is a hedonist in nearly every possible way one can imagine, he does not 
drink life’s experience to the fullest, which is paradoxical in his nature. It is the same irony of 
censoring out experiences partially and delimiting the pleasures that life has to offer to the 
perfect epicurean. It is the irony that befell much of modernity, the fascination and fixation with 
evil, the same that made Aestheticism and Decadence appear associated with negativity, and led 
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to their distortion into ugliness. It is this same paradox which will cost Dorian his life. Lord 
Henry expresses the haste to live all experiences as a characteristic of the new hedonist in these 
words: 
The true mystery of the world is the visible, not the invisible… You have only a 
few years in which to live really, perfectly, and fully. When your youth goes, your 
beauty will go with it, and then you will suddenly discover that there are no 
triumphs left for you, or have to content yourself with those mean triumphs that the 
memory of your past will make morebitter than defeats… Live! Live the wonderful 
life that is in you! Let nothing be lost upon you... A new hedonism - that is what 
our century wants. You might be its visible symbol. (Wilde 24-25) 
These words of Lord Henry remind one of a pre-Christian conception of death. The Greeks were 
concerned with philosophy as a way of control over life (and not afterlife). The drive to 
attainment of perfect harmony of the self with situation or surroundings becomes relevant in a 
system where the fear of Death marks the end of achievement. Therefore, in case of a Victorian 
version of renewed aestheticism, it leads to a pursuit of such a “test of the limits of decorum” 
(Patrick Gillespie 78) and those of self-expression as art, complete with its permanence and 
crystalline perfection. In this context, one may refer to the Stoic ‘meletethanatou’, as Foucault 
calls it in The Hermeneutics of the Subject, “a meditation on death, or rather, a training for it.” 
(Foucault 104) Foucault recalls Seneca and Marcus Aurelius in this respect, as associating moral 
perfection necessarily requiring that man lives every day as his last. Foucault quotes Seneca, “In 
Letter 12, he says: "Let us go to our sleep with joy and gladness; let us say; I have lived." 
(Foucault 105)Dorian Gray’s fear of death is not surprising, but he clearly does not associate it 
with a haste to harmonize life with society. In this context, his framing of the image of the 
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individual shifts towards becoming more similar to the post-Renaissance man. His supposition is 
that of the enthroned individual. A critical reading of Oscar Wilde’s De Profundis, makes it 
easier to locate the change in attitude of the author towards pain and pleasure. Wilde is most 
sensitive to pain in this late work and treats pain as the dominating influence on human life 
rather than pleasure. Pau Gilabert Barbera provides an interesting commentary on Wilde’s 
medievalist deviation from these ideas typically associated with Hellenism in the essay “Anti-
Hellenism and Anti-Classicism in Oscar Wilde’s Works. In “The Second Pole of a Paradoxical 
Mind”, he cites Wilde’s essay The Soul of Man Under Socialism, 1891:  
But it is rarely in the world’s history that its ideal has been one of joy and beauty. 
The worship of pain has far more often dominated the world. Mediaevalism, with 
its saints and martyrs, its love of self-torture, its wild passion for wounding itself, 
its gashing with knives, and its whipping with rods—Mediaevalism is real 
Christianity, and the mediaeval Christ is the real Christ…The painters of the 
Renaissance drew Christ as a little boy playing with another boy in a palace or a 
garden, or lying back in his mother’s arms, smiling at her... Even when they drew 
him crucified they drew him as a beautiful God on whom evil men had inflicted 
suffering… (Wilde, n.pag.) 
Also, 
(T)o find the presentation of the real Christ we must go to mediaeval art. There he 
is one maimed and marred; one who is not comely to look on, because Beauty is a 
joy... (Wilde n.pag.) 
 It becomes evident here how the easy association of pleasure or absence of pain to harmonic life 
becomes problematic post Christianity, as it does not hold the same philosophic ideal as the 
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Greeks did. Further, post-Reformation, laughter or a pleasurable life is an alternative to pain and 
not inclusive within the general resignation to situations of life. In case of Dorian Gray, the fear 
of Death does not naturally invoke a Stoic resolution. Instead, it begets more horror and fear of 
loss of individuality. Dorian Gray interprets Lord Henry’s words thus: 
How sad it is!’ murmured Dorian Gray, with his eyes still fixed upon his own 
portrait. ‘How sad it is! I shall grow old, and horrible, and dreadful. But this picture 
will remain always young. It will never be older... If it were only the other way! If 
it were I who was to be always young, and the picture that was to grow old! For 
that –for that- I would give everything! …When I find that I am growing old, I 
shall kill myself! (Wilde 27-28) 
Later, he feels betrayed by his own self. Inevitably, the self is related to its image. In this case, 
the image is literally that of Evil. Greek beauty remains a fascinating transcendental ideal for the 
Aesthete but the fear in its foulness and terror is Satanic. In the final lines of the novel, art 
captures all the beauty that the artist of the self in his impeccable performance had assimilated in 
the body. The painting is whole and as beautiful as ever whereas Dorian Gray lies wrinkled and 
dead.  
Then he loathed his own beauty, and, flinging the mirror on the floor, crushed it 
into silver splinters beneath his heel. It was his beauty that had ruined him, his 
beauty and the youth that he had prayed for... His beauty had been to him but a 
mask, his youth but a mockery. (Wilde 210) 
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Conclusion 
Clearly, Art is the identity of the Aesthete. The biggest desire of the Aesthete is the desire to 
freeze his performance as an artist of the self in a photographic frame. The criterion for judging 
this piece of art that he has become should be solely beauty and nothing else. This is the reason 
why an Aesthete feels the height of fulfillment on becoming the blue china or the sunflower or 
lily in it- for they are judged as objects of pure beauty. If the Aesthetes of the late nineteenth 
century are interpreted solely on the basis of their shocking Epicureanism, then it leaves a 
number of open questions about the extent to which they legitimized their opinions and actions 
(both of which were notably a part of the overall experiences they offered to their consumers), 
according to the Classical tenets of the philosophies which fascinated them. They managed to 
turn fascination into a consumer fetish while blithely waltzing from one subject of experience to 
another, smiling gently at the prudes who failed to resist the charm. In turning themselves into 
art, they accumulate the subject and the object into themselves and become the centre of a 
suction-point of temporality. At once, death and life are sucked into their body defining and 
deconstructing modern experience. By laughing at their own exaggerations and passing 
unscathed through impositions of censored behavior, they continuously remind us not only of 
their performative existence, but also that as audience to the spectacle of uncontrollable beauty, 
we are strangely lenient in defining philosophic schools. Contrary to all misinterpretations of the 
same persistent appeal for a suspension of ethics, aestheticism should be realized as a 
methodological ideal for literary works; a performance of extremes and a re-initiation of the 
discourse surrounding prohibition and ethical justifications of the same.  
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Notes: 
1
 See Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, Section I A Chapters 4, 7 and Section III B Chapters 1, 2.  
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